Number of words: 448

In the elections that followed the cultivating tenants of United Provinces, for the first time, decided to record a protest against prevailing conditions. In all the earlier elections (before 1937) they had consistently voted for their zamindar’s candidates, but on this occasion they refused to be so influenced. The zamindars remained ignorant of all this till the last day, so much so that Sir Harry Haig, the governor of UP, also remained convinced that the Congress would not be able to secure more than sixty out of a total of 144 Hindu seats. In the end, in UP the Congress secured 134 out of a total of 144 seats, a clear sweep. The Muslim League won twenty-nine of the thirty-six they had contested on the Muslim League ticket, another signal victory. Yet, not one single Muslim was elected on the Congress ticket, a disastrous signal for the future but only if it were read clearly.

Even as the process of announcing the election results was on, Babu Rajendra Prasad, in a press statement, had said that the ‘Congress would not cooperate in the legislature with any other group or party’. This rather hasty statement by Rajendra Prasad queered the pitch from the very beginning.

It is necessary that this is brought into account when reviewing negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League in the UP for a representation of the latter in the provincial cabinet. The crucial question for Nehru in these negotiations was not so much as to how many representatives of the Muslim League, ought to find a place in the cabinet. It was much more a concern that Nehru had whether after inducting such League members, the UP cabinet would be able to maintain its cohesion. Nehru’s own part in these negotiations was small. Soon after the elections he had a spell of ill-health which kept him bound to Anand Bhawan. In all developments he was of course consulted by Abul Kalam Azad (who conducted the negotiations on behalf of the Congress) but these decisions did not really rest with Nehru. Indeed G.B. Pant, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, K.M. Ashraf, P.D. Tandon and other members of the UP legislature exercised equal influence, on the ultimate result of the negotiations. The most important consideration with the provincial Congress leaders, as with Nehru, was that if the ‘Muslim League, with its landlord support, joined the cabinet, the Congress programme for agrarian reform, particularly the abolition of zamindari, would be jeopardised.’ This fear was not groundless, the stubborn opposition of the Muslim League to land reform in the UP during the years 1937, proving so clearly enough.

Excerpted from Page 215-216 of ‘Jinnah: India-Partition Independence’ by Jaswant Singh